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nachgehen	 zu	 können.	 Schließlich	 werden	 mit	 Schwerpunkt	 auf	 das	 20.	 Jahrhundert	 einige	
Arbeitshypothesen	zur	Geschichte	des	„Homo	Europaeus“	vorgestellt.
Some thirty-five years ago, British cultural historian Peter Burke published an article 
with the provocative title: “Did Europe exist before 1700?”* Rather than treating “Eu-
rope” as a neutral geographical entity or as a presupposed cultural or social reality, he 
was interested in how the term “Europe” was used in the past and the extent to which 
it expressed a sense of shared experiences or even of belonging in different historical 
contexts. Burke claimed that outside the very limited circles of intellectuals and politi-
cians, an awareness of “Europe” only emerged in the late seventeenth century. Even if 
the term was coming to fruition during the Early Modern period, older concepts such as 
Christendom or local and regional identity markers were still much more important than 
identification with Europe. Seen from the perspective of a history of mentalités collectives, 
as he called it, Burke thus warned us against too easily imposing our understanding of 
the concept on earlier epochs.1 
*	 I	would	like	to	thank	the	other	project	members	as	well	as	Benoît	Challand,	Mia	Saugman	and	Johan	Schot.
	 P.	Burke,	Did	Europe	Exist	before	00?,	in:	History	of	European	Ideas		(980),	pp.	2-29;	now	also	see	e.g.,	O.	
Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 5 / 6, S. 15–31.
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This article argues that we must arrive at a similar conclusion if we consider the people 
inhabiting the continent. The time that has elapsed since they began being referred to 
as “Europeans” is surprisingly short, much shorter than the rather common use of the 
term “Europe” – even if most research in European history has tended to neglect this fact 
and its consequences. This article will first look at some key moments in and features 
of the history of the discussions and social practices related to Homo Europaeus and to 
Europeanness.2 It will then discuss conceptual strategies for analyzing the way in which 
the “European man” was imagined and implemented – thus taking into account the his-
tory of the mentalités collectives Burke concentrated on, but also opening other avenues 
of approach. Thirdly, it will propose some working hypotheses on how the construction 
of Homo Europaeus can be conceived and interpreted if one focuses on the twentieth 
century.
* * *
Today, the self- and hetero-identification as European seems to be ubiquitous. Not in 
the least due to the strength of the European integration process, the term is very often 
used to describe a particular population. These days, it is frequently employed as short-
hand for EU citizens, thus giving it strong political overtones. However, there are also 
other layers and dimensions.3 For example, the identification of individuals or groups 
as the “first Europeans” takes us far back into history. Intellectuals have often described 
Charlemagne, Cicero or Moses as the first European or the “father of Europe.”4 At the 
same time, paleontologists and life scientists of various disciplines regularly provide new 
insights into the origins and attributes of the “first Europeans” – that they immigrated 
to Europe via Asia rather than directly from Africa, or that Cro-Magnons might indeed 
have been direct ancestors of present-day Europeans. Thus, very different criteria are 
used to identify Europeans – political in the sense of belonging to a political union, 
moral as an embodiment of particular qualities or biological vis-à-vis other populations. 
Also, the level of concreteness varies widely – from metaphorical rhetoric to scientific 
proof. Therefore, vagueness abounds. Yet, there is still some common ground between 
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implicit or explicit claim that “European” is a useful category for classifying individuals 
and populations.5
However, throughout most of human history, people have not used the term “Euro-
pean” to identify themselves or others. Admittedly, the first ideas about the “European 
man” – or rather woman! – can be traced back to antiquity and the mythical figure of 
Ευρώπη, a Phoenician princess whose name the continent was given. Greek authors of 
the fifth century BC, such as Herodotus or Hippocrates, provide lengthy descriptions 
of a geographical entity of that name, and for them the continent was largely defined 
by the particular characteristics of its inhabitants. Newer research has shown, however, 
that the use in these Greek sources of “European” to denote a specific group of people 
remained vague and inconsistent, contradictory and contested.6 During the subsequent 
period characterized by Rome’s rise and fall, “Europeanness” was not a very meaningful 
category. For instance, Europe does not figure at all among the dozens of geographical 
names Caesar lists in “De Bello Gallico,” such as Gallia, Helvetia, and Germania.7
“Europenses” was then famously used to describe the Frankish and Burgundian forces 
under Charles Martel who defeated the army of Muslims led by Abdul Rahman Al 
Ghafiqi at the battle of Tours in 732. Later on, the military clash came to be charac-
terized as bringing a halt to Islamic expansionism in Europe; today, the event is often 
regarded as a turning point in both European and world history. Still, it is interesting 
that most contemporary chronicles paid no particular attention to the incident or its 
“European” actors. At the time, it was just one Spanish chronicler who used the term 
“europenses” to label the Christian armies – and even he stressed that after their victory, 
“Europenses … se … recipiunt in patrias.” Obviously, their identification as Europeans 
remained rather ephemeral.8
In line with this volatility, some traits that later on became quite typical for characteriz-
ing Europeans had not yet been established in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 
The first Western travelers to China considered the Chinese to be white-skinned, par-
ticularly similar to the Germans – of all peoples! Also, early European travelers to Japan 
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often did not even bother to describe physical differences. When Christopher Colum-
bus reached the New World, he did not find the skin of the indigenous people strange; 
rather, it reminded him of the inhabitants of the Canary Islands. Hence, new experiences 
did not always lead to the creation of new categories; rather, they were integrated in exist-
ing ones. This way of seeing the other, which is sometimes referred to as “nostrification,” 
only slowly gave way to a clear-cut understanding of Europeanness as a distinct quality 
differentiating some people(s) from others; accordingly, it was only later that these “non-
European” peoples came to be perceived as yellow or red, and uncivilized or inferior.9 
This process of differentiation ran parallel to the gradual replacement of the Ptolemaic 
worldview by Copernican heliocentrism, the latter contributing to man’s increased abil-
ity to conceive of other worlds, cultures, or peoples as distinct and different entities.10 
Certainly, some ideas about “Europeanness” can also be detected in fourteenth-, fif-
teenth- and sixteenth-century sources. However, the main distinction between “Them” 
and “Us” remained between Christians and “pagans.” Many sources of the late Middle 
Ages and the Early Modern period speak – if at all – of the “European peoples” rather 
than “Europeans,” thus implying a lower level of aggregation and homogeneity. Dante 
Alighieri (1265–1321), for example, wrote of “Asyani” and “Affricani,” but not of “Eu-
ropaei”: instead, he used the description “Europam colentes,” i.e., “those who live in 
Europe.” The use of “apud nos Europæos” by Francis Bacon (1561–1626) when philoso-
phizing about the importance of naval potency for the rise of the states in his day seems 
quite accidental – the term appears just once in the whole book.11 For most of the Early 
Modern period “Europeanness” was not central, and reference to Europe remained more 
common when differentiating the variety of human existence than for identifying one 
population directly with the category “Europeans.”12
This trend also holds true for the debates that drove the rise of this category among liter-

















2	 Many	 examples	 in	 H.	 Gollwitzer,	 Europabild	 und	 Europagedanke.	 Beiträge	 zur	 deutschen	 Geistesgeschichte	
des	8.	und	9.	Jahrhunderts,	München	94,	pp.	2-38;	also	see	Wolfgang	Schmale,	Geschichte	Europas,	Wien	
200,	pp.	-40.
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different parts of the world. Albeit slow, cultural encounters would eventually stabilize 
the idea of “Europeans” as a distinct category. In these acts of delimitation and inclusion, 
three sub-dimensions can be differentiated. 
Firstly – and most importantly in the long run – people started to recognize themselves 
as Europeans when they invaded other territories. Brazil is a good example: one preoc-
cupation of sixteenth-century visitors to and commentators on South America was to re-
flect on differences and similarities to their home cultures. Some, like André Thevet (ca. 
1502–1590), emphasized the differences between the “savages” and “nostre Europe”;13 
others, like Jean de Léry (ca. 1536–1613), highlighted the similarities, both in manners 
and in physical constitution:
The Tupinamba … are no taller, fatter, or smaller in stature than we Europeans are; 
their bodies are neither monstrous nor prodigious with respect to ours. In fact, they are 
stronger, more robust and well filled-out, more nimble, less subject to disease, there are 
almost none among them who are lame, one-eyed, deformed, or disfigured.14
Léry’s rather positive description of non-Europeans is more the exception than the rule. 
In most cases, the differentiation between “Them” and “Us” was now used to estab-
lish, legitimize, and enforce the physical, intellectual and moral superiority of Europe-
ans. Still, these new contacts with peoples from hitherto unknown parts of the world 
strengthened the tendency to use “Europe” and, in the long run, also “European” as an 
identity marker.15
This is also true if one turns to the second dimension: self-identification as European 
when invaded by “non-European” others. The “Turkish threat” is the most obvious ex-
ample in this context. Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405–1464), the Tuscan humanist, his-
torian, poet and scholar who was to become Pope Pius II, offers good early examples of 
this. In “De Europa,” one of the earliest attempts to write a European history, he notes: 
“apud Europeos et, qui nomine christiano censentur” (moving Europeanness very closely 
together with Christian belief ).16 Still, the ambivalences should not be overlooked. Even 
if Piccolomini contributed tremendously to “othering” the Turks by decoupling them 
from Troy as the cradle of a whole host of Western peoples and placing them among the 
“barbarians,” the term “Europeans” was still not central for him. Instead, he praised in-








5	 Another	 notable	 exception	 are	 Early	 Modern	 views	 of	 Japan:	The	 Italian	 Jesuit	 Alessandro	Valignano	 (539-0)	
found	them	even	superior	the	Europeans;	see	D.	F.	Lach,	Asia	and	the	Making	of	Europe,	Chicago	993	(95),	p.	85.
	 E.	S.	Piccolominei	(later	Pope	Pius	II),	De	Europa,	ed.	by	A.	van	Heck,	Rome	200,	p.	2.
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the Turks. A more direct equation between the anti-Turkish forces and Europeans was 
reserved for later authors and centuries.17 
Thirdly, “Europeanness” was evoked to bridge the deep political and confessional di-
visions of the continent. For instance, Amos Comenius (1592–1670) emphasized in 
“Panegersia” that all Europeans were sailing on one ship and that at the same time, “the 
Asians, Africans and others are floating on their own ships in the same ocean of the 
world.”18 Maybe even more important than delimitation from the non-European other 
was that Comenius tried to stress inner-European communalities in an attempt to over-
come the confessional divide that was, at the time, devouring the continent from within. 
Clearly, there were many overlaps and synergies between these different debates, and in 
incremental and contorted processes they gave rise to the idea of identifying a specific 
population as “Europeans.”
Having said this, it would be problematic to ignore the voices of those who were “oth-
ered” in these processes – even if, so far, we have very little research on how those who 
were not part of this in-group used, dismissed or negotiated this label. In general, it is 
quite impossible to generalize how “non-Europeans” named and perceived “Europeans” 
in these cultural encounters. A few vignettes have to suffice. As is well known, it did not 
take very long before sixteenth-century Aztecs downgraded the Spanish conquerors from 
“gods” to regular and rather fierce humans.19 Quite generally, one can identify a develop-
ment from integrating the newcomers into existing social or mythological concepts to a 
mental reorientation with more experience-driven and sometimes also hybrid categories 
– not just, as said before, for the “European” side but also for the “non-Europeans.” 
A good example for the latter are the Arabic terms “Ifranğ”, “Afranğ” and “Faranğ” 
which translate as “Franks” and which were widely used by Arab writers from the time 
of the Crusades onwards to refer to Christian Europeans regardless of their nationality. 
The term also found its way into Persian (farangi and farangistan for Europe), Turkish 
(Frenk) and other languages, primarily meaning (Christian) Europeans, and it may also 
be related to the Thai Farang. From its non-European contexts, the expression then also 
travelled back into European sources. For example, the German “Herders Conversa-
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heißen Franken.”20 Things were even more complicated, however, because Arabs also 
used the word “Rum” to distinguish the Orthodox Christians from the Franks. All in 
all, the term “Europeans” thus seems to have been coined, and for the longest time also 
used, primarily as a concept of self-definition. This is also confirmed by sources from 
China: Particularly since the seventeenth century, Europeans – as well as persons from 
other Western countries – were often referred to as “foreign devils” (yang guizi). This is 
a sharp reminder that non-Europeans often did not see Europeans through European 
eyes but used their own concepts and terminology to speak about the “other”. In some 
cases, finally, any kind of clear-cut distinction between “European” and “non-European” 
even collapses, for instance if one studies members of the colonized elites visiting or even 
living in the metropoles of their respective empires during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.21
The propagandistic pamphlets and travel accounts, literary texts and encyclopedias men-
tioned so far also stood in close dialogue with another form of knowledge production, 
i.e., with the scholarly world. The Swedish botanist, physician and zoologist Carl Lin-
naeus (1707–1778) was the first to use Homo Europaeus as a genuinely scientific con-
cept – although simultaneously drawing heavily from travel accounts and other forms 
of knowledge production that today would be labeled as non-scientific. In “Systema 
Naturae” (1735), Linnaeus treated mankind as one species, called Homo sapiens, which 
he loosely divided into four types. In the tenth edition (1758), however, Linnaeus elabo-
rated on the description of races and attributed to them specific moral, emotional, physi-
cal and cultural characteristics: Homo americanus (red, choleric, erect); Homo africanus 
(black, phlegmatic, indulgent); and Homo asiaticus (sallow, melancholic, covered with 
loose garments and ruled by opinions). The peculiarities of Homo Europaeus, finally, 
were “white skin, a full-blooded and sanguine temperament and a fleshy body. The hair 
is yellowish and curly, the eyes blue, the emotions fickle, rational and preordained for 
inventiveness. They wear close-fitting clothes and are ruled by laws.”22
Thus, Linnaeus gave new dignity to this category by turning it into a scientific concept. 
His system of human taxonomy promoted a European racial awareness and a sense of su-
periority. At the same time, his work was part of a much larger literature on the study of 
human races that grew enormously in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. François 
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Bernier (1625–1688), for example, wrote about a “first race” that encompassed the in-
habitants of Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach (1752–1840) later introduced a racial classification system that highlighted 
the “Caucasian race,” which – at least in his earlier works – he saw as superior to all other 
races. Even if Blumenbach’s term has survived in a modified form to this very day – as 
its use in American English might exemplify – Linnaeus’ concept also turned out to be 
highly influential for later developments, i.e., to differentiate between “We, the Europe-
ans” and “They, the others.”23 
The nineteenth century, especially, saw the rise of the idea of European racial superiority 
in a development heralded in 1799 by Charles White’s (1728–1813) often-cited “An Ac-
count of the Regular Gradation in Man,” in which he praised Europeanness on the basis 
of ideas of racial and physiognomic hierarchy.24
Still, it has to be said that the ascription of “European” continued to be just one among 
many. For a long time, religion and estates had been criteria of differentiation; increas-
ingly, ethnic and national criteria started to play a role. However, there were also many 
other attributions – racial sub-categories, micro- and macro-region or, for example, as 
members of Western civilization. All of these concepts partially overlapped with and 
partially rivaled that of Homo Europaeus. Thus, the latter was only one of many attempts 
to understand and to organize the variety of human existence hierarchically.
Particularly since the nineteenth century, the concept of the “European” has travelled 
beyond the narrow circles of the educated few to become a truly meaningful category 
of attribution and differentiation.25 Today, the terms “European” and “Europeans” have 
permeated every aspect of daily life. One example of the recent trend is a brochure pub-
lished by the European Union in 2001, whose title, “How Europeans See Themselves,” 
not only implies the existence of Europeans, but also that they are united by specific 
views, including a shared perception of themselves and that it is indeed possible to gain 
access to this perception. The brochure summarizes public opinion surveys conducted 
by the European Commission since the 1970s and arrives at the conclusion that while 
a relative majority of the interviewees do not think that a common European identity 
exists, most of them feel “to some extent European.” The brochure also includes a graph 
detailing “the values of Europeans,” showing that the most important value that Europe-
ans share is “to help others.”26 
These findings almost sound like a late echo of the German novelist Heinrich Mann 
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His spirit has many potentials but he is determined by reason and industriousness. We 
love proportion and usefulness. Between the self-destructive ecstatic and the saint who 
wants to help others, we see as European not the enchanted but the helper.27
However, not everybody thought so positively about Europeans. Charles Darwin 
(1809–1882), for instance, complained: “Wherever the European has trod, death seems 
to pursue the aboriginal.”28 Although it is obvious that the core characteristics that define 
Europeanness on the individual and group levels have remained contested, the British 
naturalist of the nineteenth century, the German novelist of the twentieth century, and 
the recent document from Brussels all share an implicit consensus that the category “Eu-
ropean” is meaningful and consequential.
This brief overview of how the term “European” has been used throughout history has 
demonstrated that Homo Europaeus is very often characterized by a combination of phys-
ical, mental and socio-cultural qualities. Concepts of the “European man” position this 
creature between metaphysically charged poles, for example between determinism and 
self-determination, universality and particularity or nature and nurture. Europeans are 
thus identified by a whole cornucopia of features – genetically, culturally and socially, 
and even more often by a combination of these factors with all the ensuing unifying, as 
well as divisive, consequences.
* * *
There are several ways of studying the history of Homo Europaeus, the history of the 
discourses and the practices of “Europeanness.” The main current of research starts from 
an implicit and common-sense notion and analyzes the history of Europeans, within 
Europe and beyond, without paying particular attention to defining them. Most grand 
narratives of European history – even the most recent ones – start from such a premise; 
also, many studies on global encounters adopt this take.29 It is obvious that these litera-
tures have borne much fruit and have enriched our knowledge tremendously. Still, there 
is also the danger of anachronisms that might even produce a distorted teleology, or 
consciously or unconsciously legitimating later ideas and practices such as the European 
integration process of today.
Therefore, I would argue that the more interesting approach to studying ideas and so-
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Here, Europeans are seen not as a stable, clear-cut group whose individual members can 
be identified consistently, but rather as the discursive and practical result of endless ex-
changes of people, ideas and institutions all around the world. The main reason for this is 
the simple fact that there have always been question marks over who actually belongs to 
this population. Any answer to the question of which nationalities, ethnicities or groups 
are to be included is based on cultural assumptions. When one refers to Europe – be it 
defined by geography, history or culture – one is using criteria that are themselves socially 
constructed because most historians today would agree that no stable vision of Europe 
can be identified: the delineation of Europe’s eastern frontier as the Ural Mountains, for 
instance, is an eighteenth-century invention, supporting Russia’s claim to be one of the 
great European powers. Ever since antiquity, the definition of Europe’s borders has been 
contested. Similarly, ideas of how to categorize humans have also been quite volatile. For 
example, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and some of his contemporaries thought that the 
Arabs belonged to the same category of people as the inhabitants of the northern shores 
of the Mediterranean.30 Nor can modern biology provide adequate unambiguous criteria 
to define Homo Europaeus because genetic and other bio-scientific methods are incapable 
of defining precisely what “Europeanness” constitutes.31
The social constructivist approach is not interested in what is European about Homo 
Europaeus, i.e., how he became what he “is.” Rather, it focuses on how and why ideas of 
Europeanness have evolved, how they circulate and change in relationship to other such 
concepts of organizing human diversity, and on the practical consequences for those 
affected. At the same time, a social constructivist approach does not deny the power 
and implications of the emergence of this “imagined community.” More than twenty 
years ago, Benedict Anderson noted, “all communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact (and maybe even these) are imagined.” Therefore, one should not 
endeavor to distinguish between “genuine” and “false” communities, but rather between 
different styles of imagining and enacting such entities; social constructivism is simply a 
viable means to analyze them from a perspective that transcends essentialist approaches 
that would see them as presupposed, eternal unities.32 In sum, people understand them-
selves and are seen by others as Europeans, and they behave as such. They attribute 
meaning and prestige to this category, create specifically European habitats and treat oth-
ers as non-Europeans. They thus represent imagined – and living – creatures and com-
munities. Hence, Homo Europaeus does exist after all. However, the social constructivist 
understanding of its epistemic status differs from the essentialist models.
30	 See	e.g.,	M.	Todorova,	Imagining	the	Balkans,	New	York	99;	F.	B.	Schenk,	Mental	Maps:	Die	Konstruktion	von	
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At the same time, one has to face the dilemma that when working on this issue, one 
cannot avoid attributing further meaning to it. By describing and analyzing this social 
construct, one also adds to its very creation. Without the process of European unification 
under the banner of the EEC and the EU since the middle of the twentieth century, the 
whole topic would be less relevant. Therefore, one could argue that any interest in Homo 
Europaeus risks simply affirming the EU of our days. It might even seem that the most 
sophisticated take would be to ignore the whole topic. However, this is exactly what has 
been done so far, leading to a lack of critical studies. Trappist silence has rarely been a 
sound, scientific strategy. Even if the analysis of Homo Europaeus delineated here is quite 
new, there are several lines of research on which one can build.
A first point of reference for such a take is the constructivist literature on nationalism 
already mentioned above. Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” in the 
context of this specific literature, and together with authors such as Ernest Gellner and 
Eric Hobsbawm, he provides a solid basis for tackling essentialist concepts of identity 
and group affiliation.33 Thus, the constructivist literature on nationalism can serve as a 
major point of orientation when studying Homo Europaeus.
However, there are also some reservations. Anderson, Gellner and others wrote about 
nationalism and nations, not about the “European man” – which does not necessarily 
mean a group, but can also be singular. Even more importantly, there is the danger of 
false analogies: Europe is not a nation, let alone a nation-state; as a point of reference for 
Homo Europaeus, it lacks many of the characteristics of a nation. Research on nationalism 
is, for example, very much geared towards a political model and an institutional frame-
work, whereas the term “European” draws a good part of its vagueness from the fact 
that these political and institutional dimensions have played no important role for most 
of its history. In addition, even if one finds identical criteria of classification, they are 
often hierarchized and organized differently than in nationalism. All in all, it is therefore 
highly fruitful to use the works of Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and others as a source 
of inspiration, while remembering that they can also be misleading.
The ongoing research on European identity can be seen as a second point of reference. 
This literature experienced a first climax in the 1950s and the 1960s, with studies by au-
thors such as Federico Chabod, Heinz Gollwitzer, Denys Hay and Denis de Rougemont. 
One major motivation of their work was to search for viable alternatives to the extreme 
forms of nationalism and resulting catastrophes that they themselves had experienced. 
Eruditely, they searched for past visions and concrete concepts of European integration 
as an alternative past to the dominant nation-centered narrative, and the volume and di-
versity of the sources they unearthed in the process is still impressive today. It is obvious, 
however, that they were looking for a usable past, and any such process implies certain 
blinkers. In line with broader historiographical trends of the time, they privileged great 
33	 See,	e.g.,	B.	Anderson,	Communities	(see	footnote	32);	E.	Gellner,	Nations	and	Nationalism,	Ithaca	983;	E.	Hobs-
bawm	and	T.	Ranger	(eds.),	The	Invention	of	Tradition,	New	York	983.
2 | Kiran Klaus Patel
minds and were less interested in the social reach of ideas in popular culture or in social 
practices. Also, they were primarily focused on ideas of Europe, not of the European.34
Newer studies, especially since the 1990s, have introduced a more critical dimension. 
They often refer explicitly or implicitly to constructivist concepts. They have demon-
strated the extent to which European identity – both as a self- and as a hetero-perception 
– has been subject to historical change, even in recent centuries and decades. Recently 
identified traits include not only feelings of superiority but also of crisis: strong com-
munalities vis-à-vis non-Europeans on the one hand, yet an insistence on internal dif-
ferences on the other. Methodologically, many historical works on European identity 
are part of a – more or less socially grounded – intellectual history, for example, in the 
books and projects by Hartmut Kaelble, Robert Frank and Gérard Bossuat or Anthony 
Pagden.35 This take is highly fruitful, particularly if it transcends the concentration on 
Western European sources that has characterized it for a long time. Of particular value 
are the works of Bo Stråth and others who have also adopted an explicitly constructivist 
approach.36
However, not only historians have contributed to this research on European identity. 
Sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and many others have also written about 
this issue. Very often, however, they have a rather presentistic tendency and focus pri-
marily on political identities or the politics of identity – and thus on only one subset 
of possible questions. Still, many of their studies are highly valuable, especially because 
they tend toward multiple, nested identities and highlight the ephemeral and situational 
qualities of European identity.37
A third literature that is highly fruitful comes from cultural studies and focuses on per-
formative acts and cultural practices. It thus leads beyond a focus on ideas, concepts, and 
debates to the question of the material practices of abstract discourses, as well as social 
action more generally. Performances might then be seen as “acts, gestures, enactments” 
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and other discursive means.”38 Certainly, within the specific field, “performance” means 
different things to different people. More interesting than the fight over nuances might 
be the fact that the discussion opens up whole new horizons of analysis, and that for the 
concrete case under study here, it could be particularly interesting to research “Homo 
Europaeus in the Making.” Wolfgang Schmale is one of the very first to have worked 
with such an approach to our subject. His “Geschichte Europas” is not the rather general 
account of European history its title might suggest. Rather, Schmale analyzes instances 
in which “people imagine and visualize Europe,” thus seeing Europe as a “result of dis-
courses and performative acts.”39 A few others have also already worked with such a social 
constructivist approach and emphasized material practices by focusing on “Europe.” Jo-
han Schot and Thomas Misa, for instance, highlight the role of technology by analyzing 
how “actors design and use technology to constitute and enact European integration (or 
fragmentation).”40 Yet, for images and social practices regarding Europeans, there is still 
a lot to do.
* * *
Building upon recent findings on this issue, the final part of this article outlines four 
more general characteristics for discourses and practices on Homo Europaeus.41 It is gen-
erated primarily from research focusing on the twentieth century. In a further step, it 
might be worth relating these to the experiences of other centuries and other contexts, 
but that is beyond the scope of this article.
Firstly, I argue that ideas and practices constructed around the “European man” have al-
ways remained plural, fragmented, and polyvalent. Even in the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, “Europeanness” has been only one of many attributions used to 
differentiate between groups of people. National, religious, confessional and many other 
criteria also existed, and sometimes they coalesced with “Europeanness,” but in many 
contexts these other attributions proved to be more relevant for thoughts and modes of 
action. In addition, a person who might have identified him- or herself as a European 
at one moment might have seen him- or herself as a Catalan or a Catholic, a conserva-
tive or a consumer in the next. Furthermore, certain characteristics and criteria used to 
define Europeans might be important in some fields and at some times, but much less 
so in others. For example, life scientists tend to use different categories than intellectuals 
38	 J.	Butler,	Gender	Troubles:	Feminism	and	the	Subversion	of	Identity,	New	York	999	(990),	3;	e.g.,	also	see	E.	
Fischer-Lichte	and	C.	Wulf	(eds.),	Praktiken	des	Performativen,	Berlin	2004.
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in order to define Europeans. The 1920s, for example, saw a lively debate among biolo-
gists on whether Europeans were united by a specific type of blood that distinguished 
them markedly from other populations on the globe. Even if culturally grounded, these 
debates were deeply rooted in serology, bacteriology, and other fields of medicine and, 
more generally, natural science.42 Intellectuals such as the German social democrat Carlo 
Schmid (1896–1979) resorted to completely different categories. Instead of biological 
evidence, Schmid saw shared experiences and values as the central common denominator 
for the gradual emergence of the “European man”:
Which traits characterize this European man? … For the first time there emerged a 
creature gifted with a hitherto unknown degree of freedom: the freedom of choice – and 
to choose implies the possibility to say ‘no’! Since then man has the possibility to resist the 
imperative of fate, the yoke of causality.43
The juxtaposition of these very different notions of “Europeanness” also demonstrates 
that the criteria used pass through different cycles over time. Today, the idea of Euro-
peans being defined by bondage of blood is obsolete. Schmid’s bildungsbürgerliche and 
Eurocentric invocation certainly has also gained some patina, but the rhetoric of defining 
Europeanness by freedom and indeterminism is far from forgotten. Therefore, it is highly 
interesting not just to look at the popularity of particular ideas or practices. Special at-
tention should also be paid to the question of where different notions and practices of 
Europeanness meet, how they are negotiated and how they conflict or coalesce. At the 
same time, it is important to notice that every field of discussion generally has its own 
vision and practice of what it means to be a European.
Secondly, even when used, Homo Europaeus often appears to be an unclearly defined 
category of knowledge. Also, one finds many cases in which criteria of one specific group 
are used to characterize all Europeans. With regard to Europe – and not to Europeans 
– Peter Burke once characterized this vagueness as a “historical synecdoche” (A syn-
ecdoche is a figure of speech where a part of something is used to refer to the whole, 
similar to the Latin expression pars pro toto).44 This idea can also be found in discourses 
and practices that have to do with Europeans – e.g., when ancient Greeks were seen as 
defending Europe against Persian invaders at the Bosporus – whereas the question of 
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unimportant. But it is not just discourses that relate to a distant past in which the trope 
of pars pro toto can be found. For example, national entities continue to play an impor-
tant role, such that different nations might experience quite dissimilar discussions about 
the key characteristics and qualities of Homo Europaeus, each of them driven by their 
own national experiences and needs. Again, in such contexts specific claims – vis-à-vis a 
certain, quite clearly defined “other” – are often more important than the motivation to 
reach a holistic and precise definition of Europeanness.45
Quite often, the person who speaks also happens to be part of this subgroup of “Euro-
peans” – especially if Europeanness is seen as a positive category. An example of reflec-
tion on an extreme example of this kind is provided by Emil Janvier, a French resistance 
fighter during World War II:
Since the luck of the battlefield turned against him, Herr Hitler has discovered that his 
vocation is to be a “European”. Of course it is perhaps a bit late to be a “European”, but 
it sounds well. … What he wants is to save the whole of Europe – lock, stock and barrel 
– from the Judaeo-pluto-democratico-sovietico-Freemasons who have it in their grip. … 
Certainly this is quite attractively put, and above all it is well orchestrated.46
“Europeanness” often also remains a historical synecdoche because it is closely linked 
to common sense. Common sense can be defined as a basis of knowledge and trust, of 
experience and expectation that a certain group shares and considers to be sound and 
convincing. It is obvious that common sense can mean different things at different times 
and in different cultures. Many modern societies seem to have developed a common-
sense notion about Europeanness. As a common understanding, this often remains part 
of implicit knowledge – simply because most speakers think or believe that the audience 
will understand the message without going into too many details.
Thirdly, Homo Europaeus is always associated with specific notions of time and space. Of-
ten, different concepts of time mix, bringing together linear and cyclical understandings 
of time. Frequently, the European man is seen as a perennial category, who has existed 
since a (undefined) beginning. At the same time, he is often perceived as a future project, 
with a certain population on the way to the realization of an ever-more-perfect model. 
And yet, this process is often also seen as the return to an earlier stage. For example, 
the Polish dissident Romuald Szeremietiew wrote in 1987, “Poland is part of Europe, 
and Poles are Europeans,” explaining that “nobody had to wonder that we wanted to 
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because it alternates between characterizing a certain population with specific, intrinsic 
“European” qualities, while at the same time defining these very qualities as a future goal 
for this group of people.
These notions of time frequently coexist with the idea of certain spaces – seen as places 
of geographical origin and, particularly important during the modern period, as spaces 
of expansion for which Europeans have to be prepared accordingly. Colonial history 
might be a particularly suitable example: here, Europeans entered regions they perceived 
as markedly different from what they knew back home. Especially in the tropics, they 
were faced with many challenges. With the idea of racial superiority looming large and 
confronted with the fact that local populations had often found good ways of accom-
modating themselves to their environment, Europeans had to invent new techniques to 
legitimize their claim of predominance. It was very often in light of these situations that 
rival colonialisms found a common ground and language: they did not seek solutions 
for the British, the French or the Belgians, but rather for Europeans vis-à-vis indigenous 
populations – this again reinforced and reinvigorated the relevance of “Europeanness” as 
a useful category.48
Fourthly and finally, Homo Europaeus is often used as a positive concept by the respective 
in-group, but it remains rather exclusivist. Three sub-dimensions can be differentiated. 
The first one has to do with the other as part of us. Becoming European is thus seen as a 
process of perfecting one’s own qualities or those of a peer group. People with the poten-
tial to become European are thus turning into Europeans; “underdeveloped” Europeans 
become “real” or even “super” Europeans – or might not, if they fail to act appropriately. 
The discourses and practices that have to do with Eastern Europe offer many examples of 
this – where there have been changing needs to be more or less European. One can find 
this in Early Modern times, but also in the context of EU enlargement discussions today. 
Generally, it has often remained doubtful whether a person or a group really belongs to 
the Europeans, and this very instability of the category adds to its dynamism, and per-
haps also to its attractiveness.49
As a second sub-dimension, there is the question of the others here with us. In a nutshell: 
is it possible for a person of a completely different ethnic, cultural, or geographical back-
ground to “become” European? At first glance, racist or ethnic considerations seem to 
be a thing of the past. Today, it is – at least technically – possible to become a citizen 
of the EU, regardless of one’s background. But, can one also become a European? The 
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phrase “new Europeans” continues to sound like an oxymoron and, at least in English, it 
is today often used with regard to people from the EU’s new member states.50 Therefore, 
there is little evidence that “becoming European” in the most radical sense was or is a 
true option.51
As a third sub-dimension, we can discuss the relationship between oneself and the other 
elsewhere. As explained above, Marco Polo, Christopher Columbus, and others who had 
first encounters with “non-European” others did not always differentiate between Eu-
ropeans and non-Europeans. Today, Eurocentric ideas of superiority may have been di-
vested of their narrow, imperialist tropes. The language of globalization now dominates, 
situating the European in global markets as a hopefully successful competitor – without 
clear and explicit delimitations of others. Still, Europeanness does not seem to be a very 
open category.52
To conclude, Homo Europaeus might best be understood as the product of moments of 
crisis, in which other identifications for individuals or groups fail. No matter if Europe-
anness is defined by blood, skin color, culture or other criteria, Homo Europaeus is forged 
as a subject – and not a mere object – of history, i.e., a creature that is able to project itself 
and its power into the world, that is recognized and distinguished from others, and that 
“exists.” Certainly, this fundamental claim has also characterized many other projects and 
practices of identification. Yet, apart from national affiliation, “Europeanness” exerted 
the biggest influence in the more recent past, at least during the twentieth century.
50	 See	e.g.,	What	Do	“New	Europeans”	Think	about	Turkey,	in:	Euroactiv,	30	September	2005;	New	Europeans	“prop	
up	rural	UK”,	in:	BBC	News,	9	November	2004;	The	Birth	of	New	“Europeans”,	in:	The	American,	2	April	200.
5	 E.	Kudraß,	Kultur-Körper.	Der	ausgestellte	Europäer,	in:	L.	Bluche,	V.	Lipphardt	and	K.	K.	Patel,	Europäer	(see	foot-
note	4),	pp.	229-254.
52	 See,	e.g.,	K.	Poehls,	Performing	Europeanness.	Kategorien	und	Praxen	sozialer	Differenzierung	am	Europakolleg,	
in:	Ibid.,	pp.	23-298.
